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Abstract
Many theories of fairness distinguish between compensation factors
(luck) and responsibility factors (e¤ort). Whereas the distinction be-
tween both type of factors is a matter of denition in theory, empirical
work usually requires a sharp cut. All determinants of the outcome
of interest have to be classied as either a compensation factor or a
responsibility factor. We argue that the determinants are often hard to
classify. A pragmatic solution to the problem at hand is to introduce
a more general soft cut: determinants can be partly compensation,
partly responsibility. Still, in a rst-best income tax framework, such
a soft cut is possible only if the gross income function is additively
separable. In case separability ts the data, a simple partial sharing
rule emerges as a natural candidate for partial redistribution. This
rule can be characterized on the basis of two simple properties, equal
treatment of equals and partial solidarity. In case additive separability
is rejected by the data, we propose two alternative solutions.
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1 Motivation
The standard way in economics to assess, improve, or optimize public policy
is based on welfarism: welfare in society is measured by an increasing func-
tion of subjective individual utilities only. There are di¤erent reasons why
using subjective utilities can be objectionable. Rawls (1971) criticizes the
welfarist approach and argues in favour of equalizing an objective index of
primary goods. In the aftermath of Rawlsinuential work, many alterna-
tive theories of distributive justice were developed; see, e.g., Kymlicka (2002,
ch. 3) for an overview. Such theories often share a selective-egalitarian view-
point: equality is still desirable, but only for di¤erences in outcomes that
are caused by a selection of morally irrelevant factors.
The pragmatic theory of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism proposed
by Roemer (1993, 1998) and the compensation/responsibility framework
proposed by Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) initiated a
body of empirical work; see, e.g., Ramos and Van de gaer (2012) and Roe-
mer and Trannoy (2013) for recent overviews. These pragmatic empirical
approaches have two steps in common. The outcome of interest is linked
to severable observable determinants that are empirically relevant for the
outcome under consideration. Afterwards, a sharpcut is made: each of
the determinants, including the inavoidable residual in empirical work, is
classied as either a compensation or a responsibility factor.
As recognized by many authors, some of the determinants are hard to
classify. We provide some examples. First, the residual is the outcome part
that cannot be explained by the empirical model and captures, e.g., omitted
compensation and responsibility factors. It is therefore by denition di¢ cult
to interpret the residual, let alone classify. The residual also turns out to
be of considerable size in most applications and, as a consequence, results
can heavily depend on how one classies it. Second, some determinants like
gender can inuence outcomes via di¤erent channels, e.g., via opportunities
and via preferences. Preferences can be considered a legitimate source of
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outcome di¤erences if individuals identify with their preferences. If one only
wants to compensate for the e¤ect of gender on opportunities, one must
be able to separate both channels, e.g., by estimating a structural model.
In the absence of good instruments, such models are plagued by identica-
tion problems. Third, other determinants, like educational attainment, are
usually considered to be under partial control, say, a combination of intel-
ligence and diligence. A second-best setting in which taxes induce agents
to reveal their private information could be one solution, but the resulting
multidimensional screening exercise is rather cumbersome.1 Fourth, even if
we know that certain variables like genetic defects are inborn and therefore
beyond control, there could be other considerations, like cost containment,
such that full compensation is not desirable or simply not feasible.
A pragmatic way to deal with such problems is to introduce a soft cut:
some of the determinants can be partly compensation and partly respon-
sibility. From a normative point of view, a soft cut can enrich some of
the existing pragmatic theories of fairness. Of course, it cannot answer the
question to what extent we should compensate individuals for the di¤er-
ent underlying determinants. There is probably no universal answer to this
question, e.g., because the degree of compensation for a determinant could
depend on the outcome under consideration. In our view, the soft cut allows
the researcher to adopt a range of reasonable values that can tackle some of
the problems mentioned before in a pragmatic way.
Also from a descriptive point of view a soft cut can be better suited
to capture individual or social preferences for redistribution. Stated and re-
vealed attitudes towards social spending show a stable pattern over countries
and time: individuals are most supportive to compensate for age, followed by
sickness and disability, less for needy families with children, and less again for
unemployment; see Coughlin (1980). Such individual or social preferences
1Ooghe and Peichl (2014) introduce simplifying assumptions to keep analytical
tractability. Their results are in the end similar to the pragmatic proposal in this pa-
per.
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cannot be captured by a sharp cut. There is similar evidence in Gaertner
and Schokkaert (2012) that a soft cut based on (what these authors call)
intermediate compensation is closer to the opinions on distributive justice
in di¤erent countries.
In section 2, we model gross income as a function of di¤erent factors, but
in our model these factors can be partitioned into compensationgroups,
i.e., subsets of factors with the same degree of compensation. The model
of Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) is a special case with two subsets of fac-
tors, one set with full compensation and one with no compensation (or full
responsibility).
The central axiom of partial solidarity is introduced in section 3. It
requires that the part of a gross income shock for which the individual is
responsible, should be borne by that individual only, while the remaining
part should be spread equally over all individuals in society.
Section 4 provides the two main results. First, the introduction of a
softcut based on the idea of partial solidarity does not escape the Bossert
(1995) and Fleurbaey (1995) separability result: it can be satised only
if the gross income function is additively separable between the di¤erent
compensation groups. In case additive separability ts the data, a simple
partial sharing rule emerges as a natural candidate for partial redistribution.
A second result characterizes this partial sharing rule on the basis of two
simple properties, equal treatment of equals and partial solidarity.
Additive separability is not necessarily satised in practice. We discuss
in section 5 how to proceed if separability is rejected by the data. A nal
section 6 concludes.
2 Notation
Let I be a nite set of individuals with cardinality I  4 and let J be a
nite set of factors with cardinality J  2. Each individual i 2 I is fully
described by a type, i.e., a vector xi 2 RJ . Let G : RJ ! R be the gross
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income function, mapping the type of individual i into his or her gross
income G (xi). The di¤erent types in society are collected in a type prole
x = (xi)i2I and D  RIJ is the corresponding domain.
The planner wants to redistribute gross incomes in society. A redistri-
bution scheme is a net income scheme N : D! RI mapping a type prole
x into a vector of net incomes N (x) = (Ni (x))i2I such that budget bal-
ance holds, i.e.,
P
i2INi (x) =
P
i2IG (xi) for all x 2 D. No behaviour is
introduced here.
We generalize the model of Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) to allow for dif-
ferent groups of factors, each with a di¤erent degree of compensation. The set
of factors J can be partitioned into P di¤erent subsets denoted J1; J2; : : : ; JP ,
such that all factors with the same degree of compensation end up in the
same compensationgroup. We gather these degrees of compensation in a
vector  =
 
1; 2; : : : ; P
 2 RP , with k 6= ` if k 6= `. For ease of ex-
position, we decompose the type of an individual as xi =
 
x1i ; x
2
i ; : : : ; x
P
i

,
with xki the subvector of xi corresponding with the factors in compensa-
tion group k 2 P  f1; 2; : : : ; Pg. In a compensation group k there can be
no compensation (k = 0), full compensation (k = 1), and partial com-
pensation (0 < k < 1). In principle, also anti-compensation (k < 0) and
overcompensation (k > 1) are possible. Opinion research shows for example
that many respondents want to anti-compensate in specic cases, probably
to deter undesirable behaviours; see, Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012).
3 Axioms
We introduce and discuss three axioms: equal treatment of equals, partial
solidarity, and partial compensation. Equal treatment of equals requires that
two individuals with the same type should receive the same net income. This
axiom silently assumes that all relevant characteristics are taken up in the
analysis.
Equal treatment of equals. For all x 2 D, i; j 2 I, if xi = xj , then
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Ni (x) = Nj (x)
To explain partial solidarity, suppose that the `-th compensation factor
of individual j changes from x`j to x
0`
j , ceteris paribus. This causes a shock
in the gross income of individual j equal to G(x0j) G(xj). Partial solidarity
requires that the part of the gross income shock for which individual j is not
(held) responsible, being `(G(x0j) G(xj)), should be borne equally by all
individuals (including j), while the remaining part, (1 `)(G(x0j) G(xj)),
should be borne by individual j only.
Partial solidarity. For all x;x0 2 D, j 2 I, ` 2 P, if xi = x0i for each
i 2 In fjg, and xkj = x0kj , for each k 2 Pn f`g, then
Ni(x
0) Ni (x) = `(G(x0j) G(xj))=I, for all i 2 In fjg , and
Nj(x
0) Nj (x) = `(G(x0j) G(xj))=I + (1  `)(G(x0j) G(xj)):
In case full compensation applies to compensation group ` (` = 1), partial
solidarity implies group solidarity; if no compensation applies (` = 0),
then partial solidarity ensures individual monotonicity; see Bossert (1995)
for a denition of both axioms.
Partial compensation is similar to partial solidarity, but it is concerned
with type di¤erences between individuals rather than type changes of in-
dividuals. Suppose that the gross income di¤erence between two individu-
als can be fully attributed to di¤erences in the factors of one compensa-
tion group only. Partial compensation requires that the net income di¤er-
ence between these individuals should be proportional to their gross income
di¤erence, and the degree of responsibility i.e., one minus the degree of
compensation is the proportionality factor.
Partial compensation. For all x 2 D, i; j 2 I, ` 2 P, if xki = xkj , for each
k 2 Pn f`g, then Ni (x) Nj (x) = (1  `) (G (xi) G (xj)).
In case full compensation applies to compensation group ` (` = 1), partial
compensation becomes equal income for equal responsibility; if no compen-
sation applies (` = 0), then partial compensation reduces to equal transfer
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for equal skills; see Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) for a denition of both
axioms.
4 The partial sharing rule
Before we provide the partial sharing rule and its characterization, we discuss
two interesting consequences of the axioms. First, partial solidarity and equal
treatment of equals imply partial compensation.
Lemma 1. If a redistribution scheme satises partial solidarity and
equal treatment of equals, then it satises partial compensation.
Second, partial compensation requires the gross income function G to be
additively separable over the di¤erent compensation groups. We say that
the gross income function G is additively separable over the compensation
groups in P if there exist a function Gk : RJk ! R for each compensation
group k 2 P such that G (x) =Pk2PGk  xk for each x 2 RJ .2
Lemma 2. If a redistribution scheme satises partial compensation, then
the gross income function G must be additively separable over the compen-
sation groups in P.
Lemma 1 and 2 together imply that partial solidarity and equal treat-
ment of equals cannot be combined unless the gross income function is ad-
ditively separable. Whether separability holds is ultimately an empirical
question. The answer will depend on the data and on the chosen partition-
ing of the set of factors. If additive separability ts the data, the following
partial sharing rule generalizes Bosserts (1995, equation 1, p. 2) rule and
is a natural candidate for partial redistribution. A redistribution scheme is
said to be the partial sharing rule if, for all x 2 D, it assigns a net income
Ni (x) =
1
I
P
i2I
P
k2P 
kGk

xki

| {z }
(1)
+
P
k2P(1  k)Gk

xki

| {z }
(2)
2Jk refers to the cardinality of compensation group Jk.
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to individual i 2 I. In part (1) the partial sharing rule equally shares those
parts of individuals gross incomes for which individuals are not deemed
responsible, and in part (2) it assigns to each individual the part of gross
income for which he is deemed responsible. The next proposition summarizes
the discussion.
Proposition.
a. If the gross income function is not additively separable over the compen-
sation groups in P, then there is no redistribution scheme satisfying equal
treatment of equals and partial solidarity.
b. If the gross income function is additively separable over the compensation
groups in P, then the only redistribution scheme satisfying equal treat-
ment of equals and partial solidarity is the partial sharing rule.
5 Rules without separability
How can we proceed if the gross income function is not additively separable,
e.g., if it has been rejected by the data? We discuss two ways to weaken
the crucial axiom, in our case partial compensation or partial solidarity.
The rst one is based on a reference type and therefore simply extends
the existing egalitarian equivalent and conditional egalitarian rules to the
current framework. The second one is a more pragmatic solution that is
new to the literature.
First, in line with the existing literature we could use a reference type
to derive egalitarian-equivalent and conditional egalitarian rules; see, e.g.,
Fleurbaey (2008, 2.6-2.7). Let ex 2 RJ denote a reference type and impose
partial compensation only in those cases in which individual factors are equal
to the reference type, except for the compensation group under considera-
tion; formally:
Partial compensation w.r.t. ex. For all x 2 D, i; j 2 I, ` 2 P, if xki =
xkj = exk, for each k 2 Pn f`g, thenNi (x) Nj (x) = (1 `) (G (xi) G (xj)).
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In the Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) case with two compensation groups, one
with no compensation and one with full compensation, the current version
of partial compensation encompasses both their axioms of equal income
for reference responsibility and equal transfer for reference skill. Dene ex k;xki  as the reference vector ex in which exk is replaced by xki , thus ex k;xki  =  ex1; : : : ; exk 1; xki ; exk+1; : : : ; exP . The redistribution scheme as-
signing
Ni (x) =
P
k2P(1 k)G(ex k;xki )+1I Pi2I(G (xi) Pk2P(1 k)G(ex k;xki ))
to each i 2 I, generalizes the egalitarian-equivalent solution, while
Ni (x) = G(xi) 
P
k2P 
kG(ex k;xki ) + 1I Pi2IPk2P kG(ex k;xki )
for each i 2 I, generalizes the conditional egalitarian one.3 It is easily veried
that both solutions satisfy partial compensation w.r.t. ex. This axiom, or
the (multi-prole) solidarity version, could again form the basis of a full
characterization.
Second, an alternative more pragmatic solution is to look to what extent
separability is rejected by the data. Suppose for example that only one
compensation group, say group P , cannot be separated from the other ones.
More precisely, suppose there exist functions G1; G2; : : : ; GP 1 such that
G (x) =
PP 1
k=1 G
k
 
xk; xP

for each x 2 RJ . In this case, the redistribution
scheme assigning
Ni (x) =
PP 1
k=1 (1  k)Gk(xki ; xPi ) +
1
I
P
i2I
PP 1
k=1 
kGk(xki ; x
P
i );
3 In Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) there are two compensation groups only, one with
no compensation, say group 1 with 1 = 0, and one with full compensation, group 2 with
2 = 1. The rst solution reduces to
Ni (x) = G
 
x1i ; ex2  1
I
P
i2I
 
G
 
x1i ; ex2 G (xi) , for each i 2 I;
while the second one becomes
Ni (x) = G (xi) G
 ex1; x2i + 1
I
P
i2IG
 ex1; x2i  , for each i 2 I:
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to each i 2 I, satises partial compensation for each compensation group `,
with ` 6= P ; formally:
Partial compensation w.r.t. groups ` 6= P . For all x 2 D, i; j 2 I,
` 2 PnfPg,if xki = xkj , for each k 2 Pn f`g, then Ni (x)   Nj (x) = (1  
`) (G (xi) G (xj)) :
This would provide another pragmatic way out without ressorting to refer-
ence types.
6 Conclusion
Descriptive and prescriptive theories of fairness have been introduced in
political economy models, public policy design and equality of opportunity
measurement. Some of the more pragmatic empirical approaches require a
sharp cut: all determinants of the outcome of interest have to be classied
as either luck(a compensation factor) or e¤ort(a responsibility factor).
We argue that some determinants are hard to classify and propose a more
exible soft cut as a pragmatic solution to the classication problem. The
corresponding notion of partial compensation/responsibility cannot escape
the typical separability requirement of the gross income function in a rst-
best income tax model. If additive separability ts the data, we propose
and characterize a partial sharing rule as a natural candidate for partial
redistribution. We also hint at di¤erent ways in which one can proceed if
separability is rejected by the data. The introduction of a soft cut does not
escape the separability result, but makes the compensation/responsibility
theory more exible and, hopefully, more attractive for practitioners as well.
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Proof of lemma 1
Consider a redistribution schemeN : D! RI : x 7! N (x) that satises par-
tial solidarity and equal treatment of equals. We must show that
also partial compensation is satised. More precisely, for each x 2 D, for
each individual i; j 2 I and for each compensation group ` 2 P, if xki = xkj ,
for each k 2 Pn f`g is true, then Ni (x) Nj (x) = (1  `) (G (xi) G (xj))
must result by combining partial solidarity and equal treatment of
equals.
Construct a prole x0 with (1) xl = x0l for l 2 In fjg, and (2) x0j = xi. In
words, the transition from x to x0 is such that individual j becomes a copy of
individual i, ceteris paribus. This only requirs a change from x`j to x
0`
j = x
`
i ,
while xkj = x
0k
j , for each k 2 Pn f`g. We can apply partial solidarity to
get
Nj(x
0) Nj(x) = Ni(x0) Ni(x) + (1  `)(G(x0j) G(xj)); (1)
for i and j. Now, since x0i = x
0
j by construction, equal treatment of
equals in prole x0 requires Ni (x0) = Nj (x0). Using Ni (x0) = Nj (x0) and
x0j = xi in equation (1) leads to
Ni(x) Nj(x) = (1  `)(G(x0j) G(xj)) = (1  `)(G(xi) G(xj));
as required.
Proof of lemma 2
Consider a redistribution scheme N that satises partial compensation.
We must show that there exist functions G1; G2; : : : ; GP , one function for
each compensation group in P = f1; 2; : : : ; Pg, such thatG (x) =Pk2PGk  xk
for each x 2 RJ . In case P = 1 the separability condition is obvious, so we
focus on J  2 and 2  P  J in the sequel.
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Step 1. Recall that Jk is the cardinality of Jk. For any two compensation
groups k and `, with ` > k, we show that there must exist functions G `k` :
RJ J` ! R and G kk` : RJ Jk ! R such that
G (x) = G `k`

x1; : : : ; x` 1; x`+1; : : : ; xP

+G kk`

x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP

for each x 2 RJ . Consider two compensation groups k and ` with ` > k and
consider four individuals (1, 2, 3 and 4) with types
x1 =

x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; x`; x`+1; : : : ; xP

 x;
x2 =

x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; b; x`+1; : : : ; xP

;
x3 =

x1; : : : ; xk 1; a; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; x`; x`+1; : : : ; xP

;
x4 =

x1; : : : ; xk 1; a; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; b; x`+1; : : : ; xP

:
for arbitrary vectors x 2 RJ , a 2 RJk and b 2 RJ` . Partial compensation
requires
N1 (x) N2 (x) = (1  `) (G (x1) G (x2)) ; (2)
N3 (x) N4 (x) = (1  `) (G (x3) G (x4)) ; (3)
N1 (x) N3 (x) = (1  k) (G (x1) G (x3)) ; (4)
N2 (x) N4 (x) = (1  k) (G (x2) G (x4)) : (5)
Subtracting (3) from (2) and (5) from (4), and noting that both di¤erences
have to be the same, we get:
(1  `) (G (x1) G (x2) G (x3) +G (x4))
q
(1  k) (G (x1) G (x3) G (x2) +G (x4)) :
Given k 6= ` and G (x1)   G (x2)   G (x3) + G (x4) = G (x1)   G (x3)  
G (x2)+G (x4), this is only possible if G (x1) G (x2) G (x3)+G (x4) = 0,
or (using x1 = x)
G (x) = G (x2) + (G (x3) G (x4)) ;
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for each vector x 2 RJ , a 2 RJk and b 2 RJ` . Arbitrarily xing a and b we
can dene
G `k`

: : : ; x` 1; x`+1; : : :

 G (x2)
 G

: : : ; xk 1; xk; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; b; x`+1; : : :

and
G kk`

: : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : :

 G (x3) G (x4)
 G

: : : ; xk 1; a; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; x`; x`+1; : : :

 
G

: : : ; xk 1; a; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; b; x`+1; : : :

;
which leads to the desired result.
Step 2.We show that there must exist a list of functions G1; G2; : : : ; GP s.t.
G (x) =
P
k2PG
k
 
xk

for each x 2 RJ .
If P = 2, the representation follows directly from step 1. We proceed by
induction. Consider P compensation groups, with 2  P < J , and suppose
that the existence of functions G `k` : R
J J` ! R and G kk` : RJ Jk ! R for
any two compensation groups k and `, with k < `  P , such that
G (x) = G `k`

x1; : : : ; x` 1; x`+1; : : : ; xP

+G kk`

x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP

holds for each x 2 RJ , implies additive separability of G (induction hypoth-
esis). We show next that it also holds for P +1 groups. Consider a function
with P + 1 groups. From step 1 we know that, for each two compensation
groups k and `, with k < `  P + 1, there exist functions G `k` : RJ J` ! R
and G kk` : R
J Jk ! R such that
G (x) = G `k`

x1; : : : ; x` 1; x`+1; : : : ; xP+1

+G kk`

x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP+1

for each x 2 RJ . Using these conditions for arbitrary k < `  P , and
using the induction hypothesis, there must exist functions G
k  ; xP+1 for
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k = 1; : : : ; P , such that
G
 
x1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1

=
PP
k=1G
k

xk; xP+1

; (6)
for each x1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1. Now, consider an arbitrary compensation group
k < P + 1. Step 1 applied to k and P + 1 gives us a representation
G
 
x1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1

= G kk(P+1)

x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP+1

+G
 (P+1)
k(P+1)
 
x1; : : : ; xP

;
which can be combined with (6) to obtainPP
k=1G

xk; xP+1

= G kk(P+1)

x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP+1

+G
 (P+1)
k(P+1)
 
x1; : : : ; xP

or equivalently,
G

xk; xP+1

= G kk(P+1)

x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP+1

+G
 (P+1)
k(P+1)
 
x1; : : : ; xP
 P` 6=kGx`; xP+1 ;
for each x1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1. Fixing all variables, except xk and xP+1, we get
a representation of G
 
xk; xP+1

as
G

xk; xP+1

= Gk

xk

+ eGP+1k  xP+1 ;
with
Gk

xk

 G (P+1)k(P+1)

x1; :::; xk 1; xk; xk+1 : : : ; xP

;
eGP+1k  xP+1  G kk(P+1) x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1
 P` 6=kGx`; xP+1 :
Since this holds for any compensation group k < P + 1 we can plug it in in
equation (6) to obtain the desired result, i.e., the existence of functions Gk
for k = 1; : : : ; P + 1 such that
G
 
x1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1

=
PP+1
k=1 G
k

xk

;
for each x1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1, with GP+1
 
xP+1

equal to
PP
k=1
eGP+1k  xP+1.
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Proof of the proposition
The rst part of the proposition follows directly from lemma 1 and lemma 2.
We prove the second part, i.e., given separability of G, partial solidarity
and equal treatment of equals lead to the partial sharing rule.
Suppose by contradiction that the partial sharing rule does not follow,
i.e., that there exist x 2 D and j 2 I such that
Nj (x) 6=
P
k2P(1  k)Gk(xkj ) +
1
I
P
i2I
P
k2PG
k(xki ):
Without loss of generality, we assume
Nj (x) >
P
k2P(1  k)Gk(xkj ) +
1
I
P
i2I
P
k2PG
k(xki ):
Because the budget must be balanced in a redistribution scheme, there must
exist some m 2 I such that
Nm (x) <
P
k2P(1  k)Gk

xkm

+
1
I
P
i2I
P
k2PG
k

xki

:
Both inequalities together imply
Nj (x) Nm (x) >
P
k2P(1  k)(Gk(xkj ) Gk(xkm)): (7)
Dene x (1) 2 D to be such that for each i 2 In fjg, x(1)i = xi and for each
k 2 Pn f1g, x(1)kj = xkj and x(1)1j = x1m. Using partial solidarity, we
get
Nj (x (1)) Nm (x (1)) = Nj (x) Nm (x) +
 
1  1 (G(x(1)j) G(xj))
= Nj (x) Nm (x) +
 
1  1 (G1(x1m) G1(x1j ));
where the last step follows using additive separability and the construction
of x (1). Combining with (7), we get
Nj (x (1)) Nm (x (1)) >
P
k2P(1  k)(Gk(xkj ) Gk(xkm)) (8)
+
 
1  1 (G1(x1m) G1(x1j )):
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Now dene x (2) 2 D to be such that for each i 2 In fjg, x(2)i = x (1)i
and for each k 2 Pn f2g, x(2)kj = x(1)kj and x(2)2j = x(1)2m. Note that by
construction x(2)2j = x
2
m and x(1)
2
j = x
2
j . Applying the same reasoning as
above, using equation (8) this time, yields
Nj (x (2)) Nm (x (2)) >
P
k2P(1  k)(Gk(xkj ) Gk(xkm))
+
P2
k=1(1  k)(Gk(xkm) Gk(xkj )):
Proceeding in this way we end up with a distribution x (P ) such that
Nj (x (P )) Nm (x (P )) >
P
k2P(1  k)(Gk(xkj ) Gk(xkm))
+
PP
k=1(1  k)(Gk(xkm) Gk(xkj )):
Note that the right-hand side sums up to zero and that x (P )j = x (P )m
holds by construction. The inequality Nj (x (P )) > Nm (x (P )) therefore
violates equal treatment of equals, a contradiction.
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